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HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF
MONOPOLISTIC AND DISCRIMI-
NATORY TRADE PRACTICES
IN WISCONSIN
WILLIAM L. CROV*
T HIS is an era of industrial co-operation. The fact that individuals
no longer satisfy their economic wants through their own isolated
activity, but must depend to an enormous extent upon organizations of
capital to which materials are brought from many sources to be worked
upon in the factory in a mechanized process in which speed and quan-
tity are the great desiderata, places immense rewards upon combina-
tion, and provides the motive for the keenest sort of competition. If
unrestrained, combination knows no limits, and competition has little
compassion for the rights of others. Therefore, it is necessary for gov-
ernment, which has been described as the "intelligence of collective
society," to extend its paternalistic care to the potential victims of this
industrial warfare. In considering a preventive of monopolistic and
discriminatory trade practices, there are those who believe that the
principles of socialism have the most to offer; while others are of the
opinion that any governmental plan of control should be so designed
as to preserve the benefits to be derived from private enterprise. It is
the purpose of this discussion to show in what manner Wisconsin has
dealt with this important question.
An examination of the legislative proposals and adoptions in Wis-
,onsin dealing with monopoly and trade discrimination reveals two
major methods of dealing with this important problem' of con-
*Graduate Fellow, University of Chicago Law School; Professor of Govern-
ment, Lawrence College.
1 With all due respect for those who advocate a minimum of governmental
interference with business, and for those, too, who profess to have little faith
in laws directed at monopolistic acts and unfair trade practices, if the de-
struction of democracy were contemplated, one of the first legislative acts
would be the repeal of these laws in the various States, thus tearing away
the too thin veneer of our social order and leaving exposed the ugly strain
of human greed.
"From the beginning," says Edward Bellamy in Plutocracy or National-
isn, an address delivered at Tremont Temple, Boston, May 31, 1889, "Chris-
tianity has been at odds with its (monopoly's) fundamental principle-the
pinciple that the only title to the means of livelihood is the strength to get
and keep." And again he says that "the final plea for any form of brutality
in these days is that it tends to the survival of the fittest .... But the retort
is prompt and final. If this were indeed so, if the richest were best, there
would never have been any social question. Disparities of condition would
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trol in whole or in part. One method, drastic and socialistic in its na-
ture, would require governmental participation in the business activi-
ties formerly managed by monopolies or trusts. A suggested plan would
municipalize2 those commercial enterprises concerned with the buying
and selling of the common necessities of life; while the other would
indirectly affect state monopoly and discrimination by the nationaliza-
tion or collective federal ownership of "all industries which are organ-
ized on a national scale and in which competition has virtually ceased
to exist."' 3 The other method would leave industry in private hands,
but would attempt to regulate it by law. Here there may be rigid con-
trol, consisting of more or less elaborate4 legislation with centralized,
co-operative, or decentralized enforcement,5 or flexible control which
have been willingly endured, which were recognized as corresponding to
virtue or public service."
2 Assembly Bill 482A, 1917, would give to all cities of the state the power to
buy from, or sell without profit to, the inhabitants of such cities the com-
mon necessities of life when two thirds of the council shall declare such
action necessary to provide protection from monopoly or extortion. This
measure was vetoed by the governor on the grounds that it was both inex-
pedient and unconstitutional. Concerning the inexpediency of such a method
of control, a quotation was employed from the Opinion of the Justices
(1871) 58 Me. 590, 598, to the effect that "the less the state interferes with
industry .. . the better. There is no safer rule than to leave to individuals
the management of their own affairs. Every individual knows best where to
direct his labor, every capitalist where to invest his capital." Among the
several cases cited to prove such a law unconstitutional on the ground that
taxes can be used only for public purposes are: Opinion of the Justices
(1892) 155 Mass. 601; People ex rel. Detroit & H. R. Co. v. Salem, (1870)
20 Mich. 452; and Attorney General v. Eau Claire, (1875) 37 Wis. 400,
438, in which it was said: "The legislature can delegate the power to tax
to municipal corporations for public purpose only. . . . Were this other-
wise, municipal taxation might well become municipal plunder." For an
extensive discussion of these points see the veto message of Emanuel L.
Philipp, Assembly Journal; 1917, p. 1077.
3Three joint resolutions are to this effect: 47A, 1905; 91A, 1907; and 13S,
1911. In the latter it is declared that it has become impossible to control
private property employed in large industrial enterprise for the benefit of
society "without violating the very meaning of property and private own-
ership."
4For an example of very elaborate control see Assembly Bill 213A, 1-923.
This would make unfair a contract giving exclusive rights to sell any article
in the state or in any part of the state.
- The laws of Wisconsin do not provide for any single method of enforce-
ment. This lack of uniformity is a product of time, and is partial evidence
to support a move for a revision of the entire law in the interest of sim-
plicity. The law dealing with contracts in restraint of trade or combina-
"tions to prevent or restrain competition is enforced by the attorney general,
with the district attorney instituting action upon his advice (s. 133.01) ; unfair
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states a general principle and provides a commission with fact-finding
and order-making power.6
GENERAL CONTROL
The first general7 enactment in Wisconsin having to do with the
discrimination in the purchase of dairy products is prosecuted by the district
attorneys in their respective counties (s. 133.12) ; unfair discrimination in
the buying and selling of commodities in general use is prosecuted by. the
attorney general himself or deputy with the cooperation of the district attor-
neys (s. 133.19) ; and prevention or restraint of competition by domestic
corporations shall lead to a penalty to be enforced by the attorney general
alone (s. 133.23). Senate Bill, 548S, 1913, embodying the general principles
of monopoly control, provided for an action to be brought by the attorney
general, who should by himself or deputy direct the action in the proper
county with the assistance of the district attorney in that county. The bill
was vetoed by the governor on the ground that only centralized control was
provided for. He pointed out that the district attorneys are competent and
the system of cooperative control between the attorney general and the local
prosecuting attorneys has turned out well in practice, and that there was
no necessity for a change. "The anomaly is thus presented," he says, "of
a bill ostensibly devised to prevent monopoly, so framed as to secure an
absolute monopoly to the attorney general in the enforcement of it. To
limit the administration of law in this way cannot conduce to, either economv
or efficiency." See the veto message of Francis E. McGovern, Senate Jour-
nal, 1913, p. 1307.
6 Chapter 571, Laws of 1921.
'The first example of the control of monopolies in Wisconsin is found in
the "Potter Law," a drastic act passed in 1874 as a result of the agitation
of the Patrons of Husbandry, commonly known as "grangers." This act
regulated the rates of railroads. The haw upon its passage was held in
complete contempt by the railroads, but in an immediate decision by the
Supreme Court of the state it was upheld as being constitutional regulation.
However, the influence of the railroads was so powerful, and the people in
general so little interested in the control of monopoly that it was repealed
in 1876. The law is found in chapter 273, Laws of 1874, and the decision
supporting the law in The Attorney General v. Railroad Companies (1874),
35 Wis. 425. The constitution of Wisconsin in dealing with the formation
of corporations stated (Article XI, Section 1) that "all general laws or
special acts enacted under the provisions of this section may be altered or
repealed by the legislature at any time after their passage"-a statement
which meant, said the Court, that the decision in the Dartmouth College
case never had any application in the state, that the state "emancipated
itself from the thralldom of that decision in the act of becoming a state;
and corporations since created have never been above the law of the land."
(Page 574) Justice Ryan, in a long and well-reasoned opinion, made this
historic statement in supporting the law: "The material property and rights
of corporations should be inviolate .. . . but it comports with the dignity
and safety of the state that the franchises of corporations should be subject
to the power that grants them; that corporations should exist as the sub-
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control of discrimination and monopoly in trade was passed i1893s,
th-ee years after the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, of which it was .4yepro-
duction with the exception that it applied only to the commerce of the
state, provided a lesser penalty, and made an exception in it. applica-
tion of labor unions and some other organizations.9 The first section
states that'"every contract in restraint of trade or commerce" is illegal,
while the second section, on the proper assumption that not every re-
straint of trade includes a monopoly, makes the necessary ad,'tion by
penalizing. "every person who shall monopolize, or. attempt to !monopo-
lize, or combine or conspire with any other person to m.onQpolize any
part of the trade or commerce of the state." An additional:.gct in 189710
attempted to make the control more elaborate bind effective.by prohibit-
ing corporations organized in Wisconsin from entering.into "any com-
bination, conspiracy,- trust, pool, agreement or contrat" intended "to
restrain or prevent competition in the supply or price!' or "to control
or regulate" the price, or to "limit or fix the amount or quantity" which
might be produced. or sold. , ,
The law of 1893-the state counterpart of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act-resulted in little more than a broad statement of public policy,
was defectiveon account of the absence of an enumeration of particu-
lar prohibited acts, and was quite ineffective when tested in terms of
the number of prosecutions under it." After twenty years it had not
been used except to support a private damage claim, and then only
once.' 2 A quarter of a century after the law had been passed, Attorney
General Blaine said that while prosecution had been started, there had
been no final decision in any courts of the state.13 While the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin had occasion several times14 to deal with contracts
ordinates of the state which is their creator." (Page 574) See E. A. Fitzpat-
rick, "Wisconsin," Milwaukee, 1928, for a rather complete history of this law.
s Chapter 219, Laws of 1893.
9 See infra, p. 49.
2o Chapter 357, Laws of 1897.
1 "It cannot be said that the trust and monopoly statutes are ineffective, for
it is my belief that the mere fact that the statutes exist prohibiting trusts
and combinations has a deterrent effect a least." John J. Blaine, Attorney
General, in an unpublished letter to State Senator William C. Zumach, May
27, 1919. This statement loses some of its effect, however, by a later refer-
ence to the "possible" beneficial effects of the statutes. During the course of
his letter, also, he states that combinations have been "going on quite una-
bated" for the last twenty years, with "immeasurable harm and injury" to
the people as a result.
12 Memorandum Brief on Senate Bill 548S, 1913.
23Letter of John J. Blaine. See Note 11.
24 National Distilling Co. v. Cream City Importing Co. (1893), 86 Wis. 352;
Richards v. Am. D. & S. Co. (1894), 87 Wis. 503; Tectonius v. Scott (1901),
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in restraint of trade, even these decisions were made under the com-
mon law, i.e., that contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade are ille-
gal, and no mention is made of the law of 1893 for twenty years when
it was said in Kuhland v. King 5 that the judicial policy of the state
in the interpretation of contracts in restraint of trade was in accordance
with the legislative declaration on the subject.' 6 Governor Robert
LaFollette, in calling attention to the ineffectiveness of Wisconsin's
trust and monopoly control in his messages to the legislatures of 1901
and 1903 does not even mention the law of 1893, but says in the latter
message that the law of the state is contained in the enactment of 1897.
In his message of 1905, after speaking about the law of 1897, he says
that the only other regulation on the subject was passed in 1893, but
that the law is loosely drawn, is of doubtful construction, and will
probably be determined unconstitutional on account of the exceptions"
to its operation. It appears, therefore, that Wisconsin's control under
the first enactment was of no more value than the federal act of which
it was for practical regulatory purposes an exact copy.' 8
Reference has been made to the law of 1897. While the scope of
control was broadened in terms of monopolistic acts, it was limited to
corporations, with a still further limitation to corporations chartered
in Wisconsin. It may be that the legislature visualized the greatest
source of injury in the huge corporate accumulation of resources with
corresponding powerful social and economic influences, and therefore
singled such entities out, little realizing that great combinations need
not necessarily take the corporate form; and that they confined the
law in its application to those chartered in the state, thinking that the
110 Wis. 441; Cottington v. Swan (1906), 128 Wis. 321; 2\y Laundry Co. v.
Schmelling (1906), 129 Wis. 597; Kradwell v. Thiesen (1907), 131 Wis. 97;
Burton v. Douglas (1909), 141 Wis. 110; Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long (1911),
146 Wis. 205.
15 (1913) 154 Vis. 545.
16Thus was established a "rule of reason" ante-dating the rule as pronounced
by the Supreme Court of the United States-in 'connection with the Federal
enactment. In Pulp Wood Company v. Green Bay P. & F. Company (1914),
157 Wis. 604, 625, attention is called to the fact that the Wisconsin law has
received the same interpretation as the Federal law "at least sub silentio."
1a The exceptions were labor unions and organizations for the purpose of
legitimately promoting the interests of trade, commerce and manufacturing.
See Brief for American Tobacco Company in State v. P. Lorillard Co.
(1923), 181 Wis. 347, Vol. 1486, Wisconsin State Library, for an interesting
argument against such exceptions. See also, infra, p. 50.
18 "In its present form, during the sixteen years that have elapsed since its
passage, it (the Sherman Anti-Trust'Act) has proved a failure." Chas: G.
Dawes, The Sherman Anti-Trust Law, North American Review, Vol. 183,
p. 189 (1906).
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provision of the Federal Constitution which placed the control of inter-
state commerce in the Federal government necessitated, in the interest
of constitutional control, such kind of local restriction. In pointing out
the limitations of the law, and referring specifically to the fact that it
applied only to Wisconsin corporations, Governor LaFollette, realizing
the limitations on effective control, said that "surely the state has some
control over business transactions within its limits even by foreign
corporations."' 9 These two glaring defects in the law were matched by
a third which made illusory even the control of corporations in Wis-
consin. The legislature had provided a penalty, not for the act of mon-
opolization, but only for a failure to answer inquiries addressed by the
attorney general, a significant defect when reliance for evidence must
be placed on other sources. 20 It was the seriousness of these defects
that led Governor LaFollette to say that "the entire act, when carefully
examined, so far as affording any relief to the people, is a delusion,
a shadow, without any substance.
21
In spite of the vigorous language used and the pressure that had
been brought to bear by the governor in 1905, no legislation of general
application 22 was passed until 1921, 23 when the defects of the law of
1897 were remedied.24 However, proposals of one kind or another had
been made in every intervening legislative session. In 1923 the control
was further strengthened 25 by a law applying to price discrimination
in any ommodity between sections of the state or between those en-
gaged in business in the state.'
6
From the application of the general control which has just been de-
scribed, the legislature has excepted labor unions27 , organizations "in-
tended to legitimately promote the interests of trade, commerce or
19 'Message to the Legislature of 1905, Assembly Journal, Vol. I, p. 87.
20 Letter of John J. Blaine. See Note 11.
2" Message of 1905, Assembly Journal, Vol. I, p. 87.
22In 1909 a law was passed penalizing those who engaged in an intentional
price discrimination in the buying of milk, cream, or butter fat (c. 359).
This law was strengthened in 1923 by making any discrimination illegal
whether intentional or not (c. 406); and was made more just in its appli-
cation by allowing a difference in price if necessitated by quality or trans-
portation charges.
2"Chapter 458.
24 Approximately the same language was used in the law of 1921 as in the law
of 1897, except that its application to parties was made general. For the
text of the law of 1921, see infra, p. 53.
25 See infra, Particularized Control.
26 Chapter 406.
2' Chapter 219, Laws of 1893.
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manufacturing," and agricultural or horticultural organizations.29
Elaborate provisions, following the wording of the Clayton Act, remove
from the injunctive power of the courts certain acts of laborers or
labor organizations, as, for illustration, disputes having to do with the
terms or conditions of employment, primary and secondary boycotts,
and picketing.30 Collective bargaining by associations of agricultural
producers and associations of employees is not within the condemna-
tion of the anti-trust laws, nor is collective marketing by farmers,
gardeners and dairymen31 ; and while the Co-operatives Act formerly
mentioned certain groups32 , the scope of this act so far as parties are
concerned has been so broadened as no longer to constitute an excep-
tion .
3
The philosophy underlying these exceptions 34 is that there are cer-
tain members of society who are at a serious disadvantage in the eco-
nomic struggle for existence unless combinations among them is per-
mitted, a disadvantage which results in moral, social and economic
injury to the public. Labor has been legislatively declared not to be a
commodity both by United States and Wisconsin law; and in elabora-
tion of this idea it has been said that there is no parallelism between
the rights of labor and the rights of capital; that "labor is not only
blood and bone, but it also has a mind and a soul; and that 'labor is
the creator' while capital is the creature." 5 There are also those other
weaker members of society, as illustrated by the farmers, whose dis-
united efforts result not only in a low standard of economic life for
themselves when in competition with others who are by financial and
social equipment more advantageously placed than themselves, but
also in a substantial waste to the public through undeveloped methods
of distribution-members whose position in economic society is greatly
improved by the benefits of combination, but still "humble at the
best."36
28 Ibid.
29 Chapter 211, Laws of 1919.
30 Ibid.
31 Chapter 278, Laws of 1919.
32 Chapter 490, Laws of 1921. Those in the agricultural, dairy, mercantile.
mining, manufacturing, or mechanical business were given the benefits of
the act.
33 Chapter 433, Laws of 1923.
34 It is perhaps better to say that there are no exceptions, but that there has
been a legislative declaration to the effect that their combination results in
a public benefit. See John D. Miller, Farmers' Co-operative Associations as
Legal Cambinations, The Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. VII, No. 4, p. 309.
3 State v. Coyle (1913), Okla. Crim. App., 130 Pac. 316, 320.
36 See Northern Wisconsin Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal (1924), 182 Wis. 571.
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The evolution of the anti-trust and monopoly law of Wisconsin
reveals the application of more and more comprehensive and effective
civil and criminal remedies during the course of the years. So far as
civil action is concerned, it was provided in 1893 that the injured per-
son might recover the damage sustained 7 , but this control was greatly
strengthened by the Whittet Law of 191738 providing that all contracts
made by those while a member of any combination, conspiracy, trust,
or pool should be void, and that any payment made in pursuance of
the contract might be recovered in a suit brought within six years.
The penalties for violation of the monopoly laws have been pro-
gressively increased. In 189330 a violation of the law resulted in a cer-
tain money penalty and an injunction; in 189740 with reference to
corporations chartered in Wisconsin there was a forfeiture of the
charter for refusal to answer inquiries; in 190541 it was provided that
there should be a cancellation of the licenses of foreign corporations
doing business in the state; in 190942 appeared a provision declaring
a forfeiture of corporate rights and privileges; in 192143 there was an
increase in the money penalty over that provided in 1893; while in
192344 the penalty included both fines and imprisonment.
PARTICULARIZED CONTROL
Growing out of unsuccessful experience with general control, there
has been a movement in some states in which the legislatures have
shifted from mere reliance on a law stating a general policy to laws
which particularize the acts to be prevented. The matter has been de-
scribed in this manner:
37 Chapter 219, Laws of 1893.
38 Chapter 646, Laws of 1917. This law was proposed by Speaker Whittet at
a time when corporations were boosting the price of commodities due to
the war. Before the bill became a law it was referred to as a very important
piece of legislation, "especially in these times when the high cost of living
and many commodities of business advanced to prices almost prohibitive
of their use, have caused many to feel that lack of proper and more strin-
gent state anti-trust or monopoly laws has in a sense fostered such price
conditions . . ." Editorial, The Milwaukee Daily News, June 20, 1917.
39 Chapter 219.
10 Chapter 357.
11 Chapter 506.
42 Chapter 395. This same remedy was later applied to certain particularized
acts of an illegal nature. For an example, see Chapter 165, Laws of 1913,
refering to acts intended to destroy the business of a competitor.
43 Chapter 458.
44 Chapter 406.
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"The legislative campaign against monopoly and to protect 'fair
trade' took a long step from the codification of the common law against
combinations in restraint of trade or monopolies to declaring illegal
specified acts which the legislature considered as tending to destroy
competition. Under the anti-monopoly acts a general rule was laid
down to be applied by the courts to specific situations; under this new
type of law, the legislature describes the acts it brands as outlawed,
and anyone can tell from reading the statutes what he is forbidden todo."
While an example of great particularization can be found,4 6 Wis-
consin has not gone so far in this direction. There are two outstanding
examples of such legislation, however.4 7 One is a law which applies to
price discrimination in any commodity between sections of the state or
between those engaged in the business in the state, s and the other ap-
plies to dairy products, the material part, so far as this discussion is
concerned, being as follows:
"Any person ... engaged in the business of buying milk, cream, or
butter fat for the purpose of manufacture, that shall intentionally, for
the purpose of creating a monopoly or of destroying the business of a
43J. P. Chamberlain, "Legislative Prohibition of Unfair Practices," American
Bar Association Journal, January, 1924, p. 45.
46 Wyoming controls price discrimination in the buying of coal, oil, gasoline,
natural gas, iron ore, certain dairy products, poultry and eggs. Chapter 82,
Laws of 1923.
47 See Bill 488A, 1917, which would control price discriminations with reference
to coal.
4, Chapter 406. The language of this law was previously used in Assembly Bill
245A, 1911, which was to be an amendment to chapter 359, 1909. It declared
unlawful the selling of a commodity at a lower rate or the buying at a
higher rate in one part of the state than in another for the purpose of in-
tentionally destroying the business of a competitor. The Wisconsin Manu-
facturers Association was strongly opposed to this bill, pointing out that
no allowance was made for any difference in the cost of operation in dif-
ferent parts of the state, or in supply and demand at various places, or
whether it was a wholesale or a retail transaction, and that it did not take
into consideration the credit of the purchaser or seasonal variations. A
general condemnation of the bill was put in this language: "The law is a
most dangerous invasion of the private right of doing business, and will
result in great injury to the manufacturers and merchants of the State and
will cause a raising of prices generally and the destruction of the business
of the merchant having two stores which are operated at different costs."
These arguments appear quite extravagant in view of the fact that the
legislation was directed at only the intentional destruction of a competitor's
business. An answer was attempted to this point by saying that the ques-
tion of intention was one for the jury. See Valid Objections to Bill No.
245A, Wisconsin Manufacturers Association, State Control of Monopolies,
\Visconsin Legislative Reference Library.
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competitor in any locality, discriminate between different sections . . .
of the state, by buying such commodity at a higher price . . . in one
section ... than is paid for the -same commodity by said person ... in
another section . . . shall be deemed guilty of unfair discrimination
"49
The constitutionality of the anti-trust and monopoly laws has been
challenged on several points and on two different occasions. Section
1847e 5° , passed in 1921 for the purpose of making the control more
effective, was tested in State v. P. Lorillard Company5 on the point
that it was in conflict with the due process clause of the constitution
of the United States and of the constitution of Wisconsin. This section
is as follows :52
"Every contract or combination in the nature of a trust or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce is hereby declared illegal. Every
combination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement or contract
intended to restrain or prevent competition in the supply or price
of any article or commodity in general use in this state, to be
produced or sold therein or constituting a subject of trade or
commerce therein,
or which combination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement or con-
tract shall in any manner
control the price of any such article or commodity,
fix the price thereof,
limit or fix the amount or quantity to be manufactured,
mined, produced or sold in this state,
or fix any standard or figure in which its price to the
public shall be in any manner controlled or established,
is hereby declared illegal restraint of trade."
The argument attempted to show that the act made illegal two
classes of contracts: (1) those intended to restrain competition and
(2) those which shall in any manner (a) control the price of any article
produced or sold, (b) fix the price thereof, (c) limit or fix the amount
of quantity to be manufactured or sold, (d) fix or control the price to
the public; that (b) and (c) of the second class were declared illegal
by the legislature whether in restraint of trade or not; and that if the
second class were in restraint of trade it would be necessary to inter-
49 Chapter 395, law of 1909. This law was strengthened in 1923 by making any
discrimination illegal whether intentional or not (chapter 406).
5o This is section 133.01 of the statutes of 1929.
51 (1923) 181 Wis. 347.
5" The graphical arrangement of this section was used in the brief of George
E. Ballhorn in the Lorillard case, Vol. 1466, Wisconsin State Library, p. 38.
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polate the phrase "intended in restraint of trade" after the word "con-
tract" in the second part. But if such interpolation were made it would
be necessary to abandon the usual meaning of the word "or"; that the
second part would be mere surplusage; and that it would defeat the
legislative purpose by weakening rather than strengthening the anti-
trust enactment.
53
The Court5", after referring to this "elaborate and ingenious argu-
ment" decided that effect should be given to the legislative intent rather
than to the exact letter of the law, such intent being derived from the
statute taken as a whole rather than in dissected parts, and concluded
that there was a prohibition of only "tainted" contracts.55
A very elaborate argument was also made to prove that the excep-
tions to the anti-trust law rendered the whole law void. It was con-
tended that the "welfare" of labor organizations meant financial wel-
fare, as there were references to the exceptions to "regulation of
wages," "terms of employment," and the like; that conspiracies in trade
are allowed if they "happen" to be entered into by labor unions; that
the day when organized labor deserved special consideration is now
passed, as the labor unions have been guilty of all the practices con-
demned by the anti-trust laws; and that the theory that the labor of
human beings is not a commodity has been destroyed by a system
whereby labor union officials through organization control and market
labor power.56
The section granting immunity to associations, corporate or other-
wise, of farmers, gardeners or dairymen, including live stock farmers
and fruit growers engaged in making collective sales, was also chal-
lenged on the ground that the classification is arbitrary among pro-
ducers for profit and thus denies the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the constitution of the United States; and that there is
no justification for the exception of agricultural and horticultural or-
ganizations even though they are instituted for the purpose of mutual
help, do not have capital stock, and are not conducted for profit, as
these facts do not negative the presence of financial motives. 7 The
argument concludes:
,3 Ibid, -pages 39-61, passim.
•4Pages 372-3 (1923), 181 Wis. 347.
5r, Practically to the same effect is the statement in State v. Coyle (1913), 130
Pac. 316, 317: "But we are of the opinion that they (the attorneys for
trusts and monopolies) prove too much, for if they are to be followed it
would be almost impossible to frame a law which would reach and destroy
conspiracies in restraint of trade and commerce."
56 Brief of George E. Ballhorn, op. cit. pp. 44-47, passim.
57 Ibid, pp. 48-54, passim.
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"Hence, under the cloak of humanitarianism the legislature, influenced
by the groups, has been successfully prevailed upon to enact legisla-
tion legalizing the highest selling price and wage attainable by the
power of organization and organized control in the case of products
of agriculture and its allied industries of labor, while at the same time
keeping under the ban of the criminal law all activities or organizations
and organized efforts to enhance prices and control production or dis-
tribution of the products of trade, commerce or manufacturing. '"
While the answer to these arguments would have been interesting
and important, the Court, at least for the time being, was able to avoid
the issue by relying upon the fact that the anti-trust laws had been
enacted at various times, that the exceptions had preceded the enact-
ment of 1921, which was used to support the action, and thus even if
the exceptions were void, they were not the inducement for the statute
relied upon.59
Although the question as to the constitutionality of the exception
to the law has never come squarely before the Supreme Court of the
state, some light is thrown on its possible attitude by the reasoning
in the decision given on a rehearing granted in the case of Northern
Wisconsin Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal.60
It had been argued6 ' at great length that the statute providing for
co-operatives violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Federal Constitution. In substantiation of this it was said that all
persons and corporations other than co-operative associations are sub-
ject to the anti-trust laws, thus "jailing" one and "honoring" another
for doing the same thing; that there is no reasonable basis for the
classification, adding that co-operative association is "nothing more
than a pooling contract with the privilege of corporate entity;" and
that there is no distinction between producers and others engaged in
trade or commerce, citing Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Company,
(1901) 184 U.S. 540. Furthermore, it was said that the justification,
if any, is in the form of doing business-"the magic of the act of
incorporation,"--but that all cannot avail themselves of this privilege
due to the provisions that the incorporators must be residents of Wis-
consin, and that there must be at least five in number; and, finally,
that there is nothing in the buying and selling of leaf tobacco to justify
the exercise of police power by the state.
The Court, answering in an able opinion by Justice Owen, stated
that 'the legislature may make reasonable classifications if proper eco-
58 Ibid, p. 59.
'3 (1923) 181 WVis. 347, pp. 374-5.
60 (1924) 182 Wis. 571.
61 Brief of Glicksman, Gold & Carrigan in Northern -Wisconsin Co-operative
Tobacco Pool case, Vol. 1482, pp. 17-40, passim.
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nomic, political or social reasons are present; pointed out that the
twenty years elapsing since the decision in Connolly v. Union Sewer
Pipe Company had created a ."wide-spread conviction throughout our
nation that the farmer is subject to economic conditions which put
him in a class justifying special legislative consideration in many re-
spects ;" and called attention to the fact that during this time state
agricultural departments have stimulated the creation of co-operative
societies "among the weaker and more scattered members of society."
He also stated that there is a substantial difference between a combina-
tion of the powerful few who associate to dominate an industry and
the weak and scattered many, as exemplified by the farmers; that the
law itself, providing among other things, for one vote for each mem-
ber, practically curbing proxy voting, and putting a limitation on the
amount of return upon the stock, is not such as would give protection
to one "harboring monopolistic purposes;" and finally, he declared, if
monopoly did result, "it is lawful monopoly, and the legislature has a
right to legalize monopoly.
6 2
The constitutionality of the provisions of the law prohibiting the
courts from enjoining picketing and the boycott has never been passed
upon by the Wisconsin Court, although the Supreme Court of the
United States found a law of Arizona with similar language unconsti-
tutional in a five to four decision. 63 It would seem that the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin might hold a different view as there is a reference
with approval in the Tobacco Pool case6 4 to the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Truax case.
COMMISSION CONTROL
The law of Wisconsin in connection with the hours-of-labor of
women wherein the general principle that no female shall be employed
as to be prejudicial to her welfare, with power in a commission to
investigate, and upon the basis of such investigation to issue orders,
suggests that monopolistic and discriminatory trade practices might
be controlled in the same general way. In 1913, two years after the
industrial commission was created, a bill" was presented to the legis-
lature to establish a market commission to prevent monopoly and con-
tracts and combinations detrimental to public interests; but it fell far
short of a control comparable to that given to the industrial commission
as a fact-finding and order-making body. It was pointed out in another
62 (1924) 182 \is. 571, pp. 593-96.
r' Truax v. Corrigan (1921), 257 U. S. 312.
G4 Page 594.
r.- Assembly Bill, 1086A.
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connection"6 that the courts are unable, as proved by experience in
Wisconsin, to deal with intricate social and economic questions; and
that the solution of these difficult questions must be handed to expert
commissions with full fact-finding power "to discover the cause for
existing economic evils resulting from unfair competition, causes, when
discovered will quite readily and clearly indicate the remedy. ' 67 Attor-
ney General Blaine in 1919 suggested a commission operating under
a general law which would have order-making and enforcement power
in addition to that of fact-finding. Thus he would propose a law
"whereby all trade and competition must be fair, just and reasonable
* * * with power vested in some body to determine the fairness and
justness and the reasonableness of any trade or competition, and to
make an order with respect thereto, declaring such particular trade or
competition unfair, unjust, or unreasonable, providing not only an in-
junction, but also a forfeiture to make such order and determination
enforcible.
'6 8
In 192169 a law along these general lines was passed."° The general
principle was laid down that competition in business and trade practices
must be fair, with power in the department of agriculture and markets,
consisting of three commissioners, to issue orders forbidding those
trade practices that have been found to be unfair and prescribing those
that are fair.7 1 The department, at the request of the attorney general
66 Memorandum Brief on Senate Bill 548S, 1913.
67 Ibid.
'6s Unpublished letter to William Zumach. See Note 11.
" Chapter 571, Section 1495-14-1.
70 The law is similar to the federal enactment dealing with unfair competition
and empowering the Federal Trade Commission to prevent it. See 38 Stat-
utes at Large, 719, Section 5. Wisconsin has the unique distinction of being
the only state to adopt this principle of control.
-1 "The legislature of Wisconsin has done the practicable thing, and is within
its constitutional powers in delegating to an administrative department the
authority, by order, to define unfair methods of competition. For the legis-
lature to reject this alternative is to place itself in the dilemma of either
having to enumerate an immutable category of offenses in the statute itself
or letting its statute be destroyed upon the rocks of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in the Cohen case, if it simply prohibits without further
provision for specification of the wrong." Alvin C. Reis, The Wisconsin
Marketing Lazo, Marquette Law Review, Vol. IX, April, 1925, p. 131. The
Cohen case referred to is United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Company
(1921), 255 U. S., 81, which held unconstitutional a statute which did not
define in advance what was forbidden. The grounds for such holding were
that there was both a denial of due process of law and a failure to inform
the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.
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or of any district attorney, must assist in enforcing the anti-trust laws,
and other laws of the state concerning trade.72
There are several arguments in favor of this flexible commission
control. In the first place, it is impossible to frame a definition of
monopoly, discrimination, or unfair competition that will be compre-
hensive and yet just to private enterprise. Second, a commission, with
fewer rules and with less formality, would probably function with
greater freedom and with more expedition than a court. Third, the at-
torney general is not in a position to deal effectively with the enforce-
ment of a rigid law due to the shortness of his term, his usual lack of
expertness in the economic field, the burden of his varied duties, the
lack of sufficient investigating machinery, and the overcrowded condi-
tion of the courts in which he must bring his action. 7-
SUTNIMARY AND CONCLUSION
There are thus revealed three steps in the evolution of the legisla-
tive control of monopolistic and discriminatory trade practices in Wis-
consin. The first is a statement of policy in general terms-a statement
so general as to be practically ineffective while standing alone. The
second, while not so prominent in Wisconsin as in some other juris-
dictions, is to particularize to a certain extent the illegal acts which are
to be controlled. The third, is to put the principle of control in general
terms, allowing a commission to find facts and to issue orders having
the effect of law. That there is value in all three controls has prevented
the legislature from surrendering the first and second while moving on
to the third.
As to what shall be the next legislative step it is impossible, of
course, to say. There would probably be considerable merit in bring-
ing the present unfair practices law from its relative obscurity in the
department of agriculture and markets and giving it a prominent place
on the statute books, but leaving the enforcement with the present
commission.
There has been slow but very substantial progress since the first
anti-trust law was passed in 1893, a progress illustrating the principle
72 Berneice N. Lotwin makes this comment on the functioning of the law: "Such
assistance usually takes the form of investigations, though in some instances
investigations of the department into alleged unfair trade practices or un-
fair methods of competition have revealed violations of anti-trust laws, in
which case the facts found have been reported to the attorney general for
proper action." "Trade Practice Work in Wisconsin," 7 Wis. Law Review,
212, 220. 1
73 See Memorandum on Senate Bill 548S, 1913, for an extended discussion of
the arguments in favor of commission control.
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of evolutionary adjustment in the control by the state of business prac-
tices which are in a rather large degree elusive.74 This principle was
'announced by Judge A. J. Vinje 75 with unusual insight:
"But this problem of adjusting the rights between industrial agencies
and the public is not a problem that can be solved once for all * * *
Its solution, like the solution of all great problems, will consist in
growth, not discovery. It will consist in a continual approximation
*, an addition here, an elimination there * * *,
74 "If an objective standard for measuring the minimum efficiency that could
be expected of business units under active competition in terms of prices,
margins of profit, freedom from waste, or similar criteria-had ever been
worked out, the task of those charged with the enforcement of the anti-
trust laws would be greatly simplified. . . Since no such standards have
ever been formulated, let alone agreed upon, no one can tell from examin-
ing the products, prices, profits, or plant procedure of any competitive enter-
prise whether it is performing satisfactorily or not." Keezer and May, The
Public Control of Business, New York, 1930, pp. 40-41.
75 He was associate justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin from 1910-
1921, and chief justice from 1922-1929.
76 The Legal Aspects of Industrial Consolidations, Wisconsin State Bar Asso-
ciation, Vol. VI, (1904-5), page 159 at 179.
